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Chapter XII 
Submarine Mines In International Law 
by 
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr.* 
The extensive and organized use of explosive submarine mines is primarily 
a creature of the twentieth century, although more primitive devices date 
back to far earlier times. During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, the 
establishment of a Russian minefield outside Port Arthur generated much 
criticism.1 It was this outcry that led to the negotiation of the Hague 
Convention (VIII) of 1907 Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
Mines.2 Since that time, both the pattern of usage of submarine mines, and 
the technology involved, have changed, and these changes have raised issues 
concerning the state of international law on this subject. The question is 
whether evolution in mine warfare technology requires modification of 
traditional rules of international law, and, if so, what changes are required? 
There has always been an internal tension inherent in the law of mine 
warfare. Two important underlying principles are at stake. On the one hand, 
the doctrine of the freedom of navigation is one of the hoariest and most 
fundamental in the law of the sea. On the other, the long-recognized principle 
of self-defense has great force. The international law of mine warfare brings 
into play an attempt, under varying circumstances, to balance these 
fundamental norms. In seeking to strike an appropriate balance, many 
different factors and elements must be taken into consideration. In various 
situations, certain elements, such as the existence 'of a state of war, the nature 
of the interests of the mining state, the location of the proposed mining, and 
the type or category of mine involved, among others, playa role. 
The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Warfare (NWP 9)3 initiates 
its discussion of naval mines with the following statement: "The general 
principles of law embodied in the 1907 Convention continue to serve as a 
guide to lawful employment of naval mines."4 In examining this statement, 
one must first note that the Hague Convention deals with the use of mines 
by belligerents, which traditionally meant in time of war. In order to accept 
the Hague Convention as a guide to the employment of mines, it is necessary 
first to do away with the argument that since the Charter of the United 
Nations has "done away" with aggressive warfare as a legal concept, there 
no longer exist such corollary concepts as "belligerency" and "neutrality." 
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If one were to accept this neat theory, then the Convention, being contrary 
to the spirit of the Charter, could not be a legal basis for the employment 
of submarine mines. Advocates of this position have argued that reference 
must be made, to support the Convention's rules, to humanitarian laws or 
to reliance upon the right of self-defense authorized by the Charter.6 
To my mind, the argument is specious and could bring about undesirable 
consequences. To argue that war no longer exists flies in the face of reality. 
Armed conflict continues, though not on the scale of the two World Wars. 
One would have to be blind to the facts, indeed, to claim that the Charter 
has in fact eliminated war in the sense of the use of armed force, or to paper 
over the issue by calling war by a different name. 
It must also be recognized that not permitting the rules of war for regulating 
conduct in "in-between" situations such as conflict involving a limited use 
offorce would, in most cases, result either in formal declarations of war before 
such concepts as blockade or limitations on mine warfare could be called into 
play, or the acceptance of unregulated violence. This idea is inconsistent with 
the entire theory of the humanitarian law of armed conflict, whose principles 
are applicable irrespective of whether a formal state of war exists or the 
"rightness" or "wrongness" of the parties to the conflict.7 This is clearly not 
a desirable outcome. Thus, Thorpes has noted that a consequence of this 
position is that no assistance can be derived from these older rules at times 
when operational commanders most need that assistance. He says, "It is very 
important to remember that the actual practice of states, if generally accepted 
or even tolerated, is a most potent force in shaping the law, and in the twilight 
area between the traditional concept of peace and war it is clearly sensible 
to draw assistance where one can from the traditional law of war, and this, 
I suggest, states have done."9 This is compelling reasoning. 
Thorpe gives some examples of the state practice to which he refers. These 
examples demonstrate that in certain special situations, particularly those that 
involve some aspects of national security, the international community has 
not objected to interferences with the use of the high seas. 
Thorpe's first example is the case of the West Breeze. This ship, a British 
merchantman, was stopped on the high seas en route to Casablanca by a French 
warship. The French believed she carried arms and contraband for Algerian 
rebels. When stopped and searched, she was within a 32-mile security zone 
that the French had established off the Algerian coast. After being searched, 
with no contraband discovered, the vessel was permitted to proceed on its 
way.l0 Thorpe's second example, more familiar to us all, was the interdiction 
of offensive weapons destined for Cuba in 1962.11 
Each of the examples illustrates an interference with the freedom of the 
high seas, and in both instances the objective was the protection of the security 
of the state carrying out an act which otherwise would be in violation of 
internationallaw.12 In the Algerian situation, it is clear that the boarding and 
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searching of the British vessel in peacetime would have been contrary to 
international law . The right of a warship to visit and search is a right confmed, 
on the high seas, to belligerents. In the Cuban interdiction, normally referred 
to as "quarantine," the activities undertaken by the u.s. Navy resembled, 
but were not identical to, a blockade. The right of blockade, like the right 
of visit, is a right of a belligerent. In this regard, they both are similar to 
the right to lay mines. That the activity was conducted in a limited way is 
suggestive of application of the laws of war. Thorpe's point, therefore, is 
that state practice continues to support the application of the laws of war, 
and thus it is legitimate to say that the Hague Convention remains a valid 
set of guidelines with respect to the employment of mines, unless it can be 
shown that these rules do not adequately serve the newer technologies that 
have been developed. 
There is no doubt that the Hague rules were developed to be utilized in 
time of war.13 These rules do not render the use of naval mines illegal. Rather, 
they provide for certain restrictions for the purpose of protecting neutral 
shipping. While regarding mining as legal in proper circumstances, one must 
be mindful of the provisions of other relevant conventions. For example, 
Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts prohibits 
weapons" of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. "14 
Given that this Protocol comes some 70 years after the Hague Convention, 
and taking account of the state practice and attitudes of maritime states in 
the interim, it can hardly be argued that the Protocol was aimed at mines. 
The Hague rules themselves were designed to limit the effect of mines on 
neutral shipping. Likewise, the similar language used in Hague Convention 
No. IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on LandiS should 
not be viewed as limiting the Hague rules regarding mines. As was argued 
above, state practice seems to support the principle that the rules have certain 
applicability in conditions short of formal war, such as periods of high 
tensions, where the need to protect neutral shipping is just as strong as in 
wartime. Accordingly, I shall examine first what the rules provide for in 
wartime, and then move to questions of restrictions during peacetime and 
periods of high tension or undeclared hostilities, such as the Vietnam conflict. 
It will be necessary, in each case, to address the question of the impact of 
new technologies, today and in the future, on the application of rules 
structured to deal with mines as they were known at the time the Convention 
was negotiated. 
To begin with, the Hague rules do not by their terms differentiate between 
various zones of the oceans, except that article 2 proscribes the laying of 
"automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole 
object of intercepting commercial shipping."16 Obviously, the qualification 
contained in that phrase creates a yawning loophole in the prohibition, since 
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it could easily be circumvented by arguing that the mines were laid for another 
purpose, e.g., a legitimate blockade. Thus, belligerents have the right to lay 
mines in their own territorial seas and internal waters, and in many instances 
in those of the enemy. While the Convention does not expressly refer to the 
high seas, and thus mines may also be sown there, a reasonable inference is 
that such laying should not be done indiscriminately and should be restricted 
to reasonably limited areas. Article 3 requires "every possible precaution" 
to protect peaceful shipping and, when the minefield is no longer under 
surveillance, notification of the danger zones as soon as military exigencies 
permit.17 Neutral powers are permitted to mine their own waters18 and, by 
implication, belligerents may not do so because such mining would be a 
violation of the neutral's sovereignty. The Convention applies to anchored 
automatic contact mines, and also to unanchored contact mines, which are 
prohibited except when constructed to become harmless one hour at most 
after control is lost over them.19 Anchored mines must also become harmless 
if they should break their moorings.20 
How should these rules be interpreted with respect to more modem devices 
not envisaged at the time they were adopted? The principles they embody 
give us some guidance. 
As previously noted, the Hague rules were not designed to prohibit mines 
as a weapon, but rather to place limitations upon their use that relate to 
maintaining control over them to protect neutral shipping. This is implicit 
in rules requiring anchored mines to neutralize themselves should they break 
loose from their moorings, rules prohibiting unanchored mines that do not 
neutralize within an hour, rules requiring belligerents to do their utmost to 
remove mines at the cessation ofhostilities,21 and rules regarding notice. Thus 
it can be inferred that new, high technology mines should be acceptable if 
they satisfy the same objectives. New weapons that are under an acceptable 
level of control by the party laying them, or which do not threaten neutral 
surface shipping, would seem to be acceptable. One such weapon referred 
to by Thorpe is the continental-shelf mine. He notes that this mine will be 
a "short tethered rocket-propelled warhead" that is designed to be remotely 
activated by acoustic link telemetry.22 Given the degree of control over this 
device, it is likely that its use would not create the kind of hazards which 
the Hague rules were conceived to prevent. Since these mines would likely 
be deployed beyond the territorial sea, however, the proscriptions requiring 
localization and notice would seem to be applicable. 
But should one speculate that it is possible that these rocket-propelled 
devices could be deployed with nuclear capability, then I believe the 
conclusion should be otherwise. This prospect raises the question whether 
such devices would be prohibited by the Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons anq. Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 
on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and Subsoil Thereof.23 While it could 
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be argued that tethered mines are not "emplaced" on the ocean floor, that 
argument is transparently thin. A nuclear-tipped continental-shelf mine 
clearly violates the spirit if not the letter of that treaty. Nor does it help 
the issue much to argue that since these rockets might be directed only at 
belligerent submarines, and thus pose little if any risk to surface shipping, 
they are not precluded. By the better logic, keeping in mind the probable 
reaction of neutrals to the emplacement of such weapons, the Hague rules 
seem to exclude them from use. Other conceivable new technologies could 
be examined along similar lines. 
Are the same rules applicable in peacetime? In examining this question, 
it is necessary to distinguish between time of unquestioned peace, that is, the 
complete lack of hostilities in the area, and time of peace in which there are 
nonetheless existing hostilities. This is the situation that obtains in an 
"undeclared war" where the rules of belligerency and neutrality do not apply, 
at least in the formal sense. Some insight can be gained in this latter category 
by examining the Corfu Channel Case'M decided by the International Court of 
Justice in 1949. It can be recalled that the major issue in that case was whether 
states in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits 
used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without 
the previous authorization of a coastal state, provided that the passage is 
innocent. The court held in the affirmative. But a second issue arose as a 
result of the fact that at one point two British destroyers struck mines in 
the Albanian portion of the channel causing considerable damage and loss 
of life. The Court agreed with the British contention that Albania was 
responsible. It held that this responsibility rested on the basis of elementary 
principles of humanity, and the principle that every state has an obligation 
not knowingly to permit acts in its territory contrary to the rights of other 
states. The holding, therefore, recognized a customary international law right 
to mine one's own territorial sea, but also a duty to notify of the presence 
and location of those mines. 
Rules concerning the peaceful uses of the oceans are governed by treaty 
law. Both the Geneva Conventions of 195825 and the 1982 U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea26 address such questions. Although the 1982 treaty is 
not yet in force,27 there are relevant provisions representing at least emerging 
rules of customary international law prior to the Convention's entry into 
force. 
What are the implications of its provisions with respect to the question 
of peacetime mining of the territorial sea? Article 17 accords the right of 
innocent passage to all vessels navigating in the territorial sea.28 Article 24 
proscribes the coastal state from hampering that right. Initially, then, one 
might argue that emplacement of mines in the territorial sea by the coastal 
State would hamper the right of innocent passage. However, article 25 makes 
it clear that the coastal State may suspend that right for reasons of security, 
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at least temporarily, in specified areas of its territorial sea. It would thus seem 
that mines could be laid in such areas or other areas in which there might 
be no substantial vessel traffic. Article 24(2) places an obligation on the coastal 
state to give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation. Furthermore, 
article 22 permits a coastal state, for safety of navigation, to restrict passage 
of foreign vessels to certain specified sea lanes or traffic separation schemes. 
Reading these together, it would appear that a coastal state in peacetime could 
mine its territorial sea, provided that the notice required by article 24 is given. 
Limiting passage to safe areas and times would hardly be considered 
"hampering" the general right of innocent passage in such circumstances, 
because that term means actions of a coastal state that would discriminate 
among foreign ships, or restrict vessels in the territorial sea that would 
virtually deprive them of their legal right to innocent passage. It does not 
proscribe reasonable regulation. 
Article 38 of the treaty, in what some believe to be new law, provides 
for the right of transit passage for vessels passing through straits used for 
international navigation. This right, unlike innocent passage, is not 
suspendable. Like innocent passage, however, littoral states must give 
publicity to known dangers.29 Because these passageways are sometimes only 
a mile or less wide, and because they often are vital waterways for 
international trade and military use, it is more than likely that any attempt 
to mine them would meet with instant protests from major maritime nations. 
I would conclude, therefore, that mining of international straits in peacetime 
would not be acceptable under customary rules. The same would hold true 
for routes designated as archipelagic sea lanes, subject to archipelagic sea lanes 
passage.30 
It would seem difficult, in general, to justify the laying of mines on the 
high seas, beyond national jurisdiction, absent some strong showing that 
would engage a coastal state's traditional right to defend itself. In peacetime, 
a claim of self-defense justifying such a strong measure would be difficult 
to demonstrate. Again, laying of high seas mines would most likely be viewed 
by maritime states as an unreasonable interference with the freedom of 
navigation on the high seas guaranteed by article 87. The navigation rights 
contained in that article are incorporated into the exclusive economic zone 
rules by a cross-reference in article 58, while the rights of the coastal State 
in that zone are limited by article 56 to those that are essentially economic 
in nature. Thus the rules in the EEZ should be the same, as regards peacetime 
minelaying, as for the high seas beyond. This conclusion is reinforced by 
article 88, also applicable in the EEZ, which specifies that the high seas are 
reserved for peaceful purposes.31 Finally, attention should be called to article 
300, that calls upon all state parties to the Convention to exercise their rights, 
freedoms, and jurisdiction in a manner that would not amount to an abuse 
of rights. It would seem that mining other thaD. in restricted areas of the 
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territorial sea in peacetime would raise that issue.32 Arguably, however, the 
emplacement of such weapons as the continental-shelf mine, previously 
referred to, in the high seas or the EEZ might be distinguished on the grounds 
that they are controlled and inert until activated, thus posing no threat to 
surface shipping. Technically, these devices are not mines at all while inert, 
and thus their emplacement in peacetime would not be proscribed, nor would 
notice of that emplacement be required. Such emplacement arguably could 
be justified on the ground referred to by Myers McDougal as a "preparation 
for self-defense. "33 
Returning once again to the special "peacetime" situation where tensions 
or even hostilities not amounting to a formal war exist in an area, the question 
is whether a different set of rules do or ought to apply.34 The most recent 
and classic example of this situation was the Viet Nam "war." During that 
conflict the United States mined Haiphong Harbor. Thorpe calls this "the 
most interesting [mining] case since 1945."35 Mining of the harbor was first 
considered in 1968, but was rejected on the grounds that there was in fact 
no great military need to cut off military supplies flowing from the Soviet 
Union to North Viet Nam. At the time, the Director of the International 
Law Division, U.S. Navy Office of the Judge Advocate General, said: "If 
a legal state of war existed between the United States and North Vietnam 
we could immediately blockade the port of Hai-phong as a belligerent right 
of warfare. Without a state of war such a blockade would be of doubtful 
legality. A similar analysis could be made with respect to ~ning harbors, 
contraband, neutrality, and the right of visit and search on the high seas."36 
Note that this statement seems to rest on the traditional notions of war and 
peace. But by 1972, conditions had changed considerably. A major North 
Vietnamese offensive had been mounted and it was now necessary for purposes 
of military defense to stem the flow of Soviet weapons to the south. Thorpe 
describes the situation as follows: 
The solution to the tactical problems of the mining had to allow the objectives to be 
achieved without unnecessary risk to international shipping. If Hague Convention No. 
VIII applied to unmoored influence mines and if instant notification was required, the 
mine-laying aircraft in subsequent waves would be at risk. In fact the decision was taken 
to lay in the internal waters and territorial seas of North Vietnam inactive mines that 
would become active after a period of 3 days, and give warning to all shipping once 
the aircraft had all returned. Of the 36 ships in harbor at Hai-Phong at the time of 
the announcement over one-quarter were under way within 3 hr. No ships were lost, 
the traffic to and from Hai-Phong was effectively disrupted and, of course, the 
departures from Vietnam and the release of prisoners of war followed shortly thereafter. 
The mining was justified and reported in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter 
by the U.S.A. as an exercise of the right of self-defense in view of the attack against 
South Vietnam and the need to protect the 60,000 remaining U.S. Troops.37 
What was the reaction of the international community? Very little. In a 
letter from the representative of the U.S.S.R. to the President of the Security 
Council, the Soviets protested the mining, saying that the U.S. action was 
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a violation of the freedom of the high seas (even though the mines were in 
internal waters and the territorial sea), and rejected the u.s. claim of self-
defense. The letter stated "that no aggression has been committed against 
the United States. On the contrary, the United States itself is acting as an 
aggressor in Viet-Nam."38 A similar letter was submitted by the People's 
Republic of China.39 Neither protest made any mention whatsoever of the 
Hague Convention or the customary law of mine warfare. 
Reference again should be made to the analogous use of the belligerent 
right of blockade. As previously noted, the Cuban quarantine was not a 
traditional blockade because it did not fulfIll the formal requirements. Nor 
was there a state of war in existence between the United States and Cuba. 
That event represents a modified rule of blockade responsive to and justified 
by the needs of the situation at the time. The justification was on the ground 
of collective self-defense under the Rio Pact of 1947. The widespread support 
among members of the Organization of American States supplied the 
necessary opinio juris. One commentator noted that "the Cuban situation 
illustrates that where the circumstances are right, a state will insist, even in 
a peacetime situation, to what was traditionally known as a belligerent right. 
The question today really is not a purely legal one, and it never really was. "40 
Dean Acheson went further in a comment to the American Society of 
International Law, when he said: "I must conclude that the propriety of the 
Cuban quarantine is not a legal issue .... No law can destroy the state creating 
the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law. "41 To me, however, 
basing the quarantine on raw power, and not the law, is a most dangerous 
proposition. 
The foregoing examples indicate a growing state practice embodying some 
of th~ rules regarding the law of war in a situation short of war. These 
examples are buttressed by the ruling of the International Court of Justice 
in the Nicaragua Case.42 In that case, the Court found that on a date late 
in 1983 or early 1984, the President of the United States authorized a United 
States government agency to lay mines in Nicaraguan ports; that in early 1984, 
mines were laid in or close to the ports of EI Bluff, Cormto and Puerto 
Sandino, either in Nicaraguan internal waters or in its territorial sea or both, 
by persons in the pay of that agency. It found that at no time did the United 
States issue any public warning to international shipping of the existence and 
location of the mines. It found further that personal and material injury was 
caused by the explosion of the mines. The Court decided that by laying these 
mines, the United States acted in breach of its obligations under customary 
international law not to use force against another state, not to intervene in 
its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty, and not to interrupt peaceful maritime 
commerce. While the holding does not deal with the law of mine warfare 
as discussed here, a plea of self-defense was rejected. Clearly, even under 
the Hague rules, such mining cannot be defended. 
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Before concluding this commentary, some attention should be devoted to 
the operations that have recently taken place in the Persian Gulf. The author 
is not privy to any facts not appearing in the public media, so the underlying 
assumption is that they are fairly reported, which may indeed not be the case. 
The reflagging by the u.s. of eleven Kuwaiti tankers brought about a number 
of responses from Iran, including the indiscriminate laying of mines in various 
areas of the Persian Gulf. Assuming that some, if not most, of these areas 
lie outside of anyone's territorial sea, did Iran have the right to lay these mines 
under the rules that we have examined? First of all, the activities under 
examination took place during a limited conflict. This introduces more vividly 
the element of self-defense. But the question is whether Iran's targeting of 
shipping owned by a neighboring, but only arguably neutral, state under the 
flag of a noncombatant can be supported by the concept of self-defense. The 
answer depends upon how one views that traditional international righ::. 
Professor Jack Grunawalt of the Naval War College views self-defense as 
broader than traditional approaches would have us believe. It is his contention 
that the experiences of the two World Wars demonstrate that much of the 
law of neutrality has been ignored, and that in time of war, one of the weapons 
utilized was the all-out attack on the movement of goods to and from a 
belligerent, whether carried in neutral hulls or not. The objective was to 
destroy the enemy's economic capacity to maintain the war. If one perceives 
the destruction of Iraqi oil (or that of its supporters) in the same light, the 
argument can be made on Iran's behalf in the Persian Gulf. In reference to 
the Persian Gulf, Professor Grunawalt has said: "I would suggest to you that 
the law ought to recognize that neutral shipping that sustains a belligerent's 
warfighting capability may be subject to interdiction by whatever platforms 
and weapons system are available to the other side to accomplish that purpose. 
I would also suggest that the modern law of neutrality, as reflected in the 
customary practice of nations in this century, does in fact support that 
result. "43 Given the prior analysis of the mining of Haiphong harbor by the 
United States, it would appear that his argument has a basis in practice, and, 
if properly carried out, is acceptable to most maritime powers. I must confess 
that, while I am drawn to the logic of the argument, I am deeply concerned 
that if carried to extremes it could destroy the very concept of neutrality 
and in large part the freedom of the seas. No ship, no cargo would be safe 
in an area of conflict. But even if the premise is accepted, the differences 
between the existing situation and that in Viet Nam are notable in the manner 
in which the mining was carried out. As we have previously noted, mining 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction can be supported where there is 
a legitimate national security objective. Even then, the rules regarding 
localization and notification must be followed, as they were in Haiphong. 
Thus the indiscriminate, non-notified mining by Iran cannot be found to be 
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within the rules. Whether the u.s. response in attacking and sinking the mine-
laying vessel is within the bounds of reasonable response is a separate issue. 
In conclusion, a good argument can be made that the Hague Convention 
rules continue to be viable in this age of new technology, that they provide 
reasonable rules of conduct, and that these rules seem to be recognized and 
followed. Thus the rules remain good guidelines for the operational 
commander, and the Handbook under discussion correctly sets them forth for 
the purpose. 
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